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11 Introduction
Two very diﬀerent perspectives on the virtues and vices of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) are pitted against each other in the policy debate. Some see the WTO mainly as
a vehicle to reduce border measures, such as tariﬀs, quotas, and export subsidies. While
acknowledging that trade liberalization may have negative eﬀects on certain income groups,
adherents of this view typically believe that it yields aggregate gains. This view, cherished by
economists and many policy makers, is closely in line with the economic literature on trade
agreements, which typically sees trade agreements as means of escaping Prisoners’ Dilemma
problems with regard to trade instruments. But there is also a much more critical perspective,
which sees the WTO as reaching deep into the economies of its Members, signiﬁcantly
constraining their sovereignty to freely determine domestic regulations aﬀecting, for instance,
health and the environment, with an unclear or negative impact on many of the countries
involved.
The literature on trade agreements is not really equipped to address the validity of this
critique, since it largely neglects the impact of agreements and provisions in the WTO that
seek to inﬂuence domestic policy making (we will point to some exceptions below). In
particular, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no analysis of the impact of the central
WTO provision with this aim: the non-discrimination principle of National Treatment (NT),
which loosely speaking requires that once imported, foreign products are given at least as
favorable a treatment as “like” domestic products. NT is a core undertaking in the WTO
in almost all areas. For instance, it appears as Art. III in the General Agreement on Tariﬀs
and Trade 1947 (henceforth the “GATT”), as Art. XVII in the General Agreement on
Trade in Services, and as Art. 3 in the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
2Rights.1 These provisions cover virtually every governmental policy of the 150 Members
of the WTO, whether it is a tax, law, regulation, etc., as long as it aﬀects the conditions,
widely interpreted, for sale and distribution of imported goods, services, and intellectual
property. Moreover, as will be explained below, NT provisions do not only cover explicitly
discriminatory internal measures, but also measures that indirectly have such consequences.
Since NT may potentially constrain not only protectionist use of internal measures, but
possibly also their use for legitimate reasons, the validity of the critique of the WTO cannot
be assessed without a careful analysis of the ramiﬁcations of this provision. The purpose
of this paper is to initiate an investigation of the role of the basic incarnation of NT in the
WTO — Art. III GATT as it applies to internal taxation.2
An economic analysis of NT is warranted not only from a policy point of view, but
also from a more narrow theory point of view. Absent such a provision, members of a trade
agreement would typically be free to impose whatever domestic taxes they desired, and could
therefore legally undo any tariﬀ agreement to the extent that they found this desirable. For
instance, it is diﬃcult to see why countries absent NT could not impose, for instance, speciﬁc
sales taxes for imported and domestic products.3
Yet another reason why economic analysis of NT is called for is the lack of coherence
and economic (as well as legal) logic in GATT/WTO case law on NT. It appears as if an
important reason for this is the lack of a conceptual framework in which to interpret the
1 NT provisions can also be found in virtually every other trade agreement, such as in a number
of Chapters of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and as it concerns taxation in Art. 90
of the Treaty of Rome. Further, Art. 301 NAFTA stipulates that “Article III of the GATT and its
interpretative notes ... are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement”.
2 Throughout the paper, “GATT” refers to the core of the WTO agreement on trade in goods,
and not to the organization that was superseded through the creation of the WTO. Also, “Art.
III” denotes Art. III GATT, etc..
3 The only possible deterrent in the GATT would be the threat of so-called “non-violation
complaints”. But as argued below, there are reasons to believe that these are not likely to serve
this purpose very well.
3text. Economic analysis could play a vital role in steering future case law in an economically
speaking more desirable direction.
What is then the role of NT in the GATT? The GATT clearly treats internal measures
very diﬀerently from border measures. The latter are largely explicitly regulated; for in-
stance, tariﬀ levels are bound, import and export quotas as well as export subsidies are
prohibited, etc. Internal measures, on the other hand, are left to be unilaterally deter-
mined by the contracting parties. The reason is not simply uncertainty, since this could be
dealt with through state-contingent contracts. Instead, it seems as if such complex state-
contingent contracts are infeasible due to the costs of writing and enforcing them, and/or
due the diﬃculty in foreseeing all regulatory needs that may arise. For these reasons, the
agreement is incomplete, leaving to the members to unilaterally determine internal policies
with signiﬁcant externalities on trading partners. But the agreement cannot leave inter-
nal instruments completely unregulated, since this would enable countries to use internal
measures to undo whatever restrictions are agreed upon regarding border measures. NT is
the ﬁrst line defense against such behavior, and must thus be understood as an attempt to
remedy problems caused by incompleteness of the agreement.
This is obviously not the ﬁrst paper to investigate the consequences of contractual incom-
pleteness in the context of trade agreements. Copeland (1990) analyzed the impact of trade
agreements in a case where governments have access to imperfect substitutes to the policies
bound through agreements. In a number of papers, Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger
have considered various aspects of the contractual incompleteness of the GATT. In partic-
ular, in Bagwell and Staiger (1999), they analyze the impact of renegotiations (as allowed
for under Art. XXVIII GATT) on the stability of negotiated outcomes. Wilfred J. Ethier
has also looked at the consequences of contractual incompleteness for the optimal design of
a trade agreement in several papers, and the dispute settlement system is highlighted from
4this perspective in Ethier (2002).
Closer to the present analysis, both in terms of the issues addressed and the model
employed, is Ederington (2001). Ederington assumes that each of two countries levies a
tariﬀ and they also have access to a domestic policy instrument that substitutes imperfectly
for the tariﬀs. Domestic production is associated with a negative externality, providing a
welfare rationale for the domestic tax, which at the same time can be used for protectionist
purposes. It is shown that the tax is nevertheless set at a non-distortionary level, both in
the case of one-shot, non-cooperative setting of tariﬀs and taxes, as well as in the case of a
self-enforcing agreement on tariﬀs and taxes, supported through grim trigger strategies in
an inﬁnite repetition of the one-shot game.
In the papers mentioned above, the governments have access to a single domestic policy
instrument, and these papers can therefore only shed limited light on the impact of NT in
reducing discrimination. But two recent papers explicitly consider international agreements
to counter discrimination. Battigalli and Maggi (2003) examine the role of international
agreements on product standards. It is shown how the incompleteness of the trade agree-
ment provides a role for a central dispute settlement mechanism. While there are similarities
between this setup and the one here, there are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences. In particular, the
emphasis here is on the interaction between tariﬀ liberalization and domestic tax setting
under NT, whereas in their model, there is no tariﬀ setting stage. Furthermore, the inter-
est here mainly focuses on the ability of NT to handle situations with inherent diﬀerences
between domestic and foreign products, while in their setup, there are no such diﬀerences.
C l o s e rt ot h ep r e s e n tp a p e ri st h ea n a l y s i si nP i e n a a r( 2 0 0 5 )o ft h er o l ea n di m p a c to ft h e
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) — the WTO
agreement regulating government measures toward health risks in foodstuﬀs. A basic idea
in the SPS Agreement is that there should be a certain consistency in how governments
5treat risks associated with domestic and foreign products, a notion that is closely related to
NT in spirit. But while sharing certain methodological similarities, the two papers focus on
entirely diﬀerent issues.
Also, the role of NT is further highlighted in ongoing work (Horn, Maggi and Staiger
(2005)), where a model with explicit contracting costs is employed in order to endogenously
determine the incomplete structure of a trade agreement that in addition to possibly binding
tariﬀs, production subsidies and/or domestic taxes, also may include an NT provision or a
non-violation instrument.
Finally, this paper heavily relies on the legal analysis of Art. III.2 GATT disputes in
Horn and Mavroidis (2004), as well as the vision of the working of NT developed there.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The economic framework is laid out in Section
2. Following the bulk of the literature, the purpose of the GATT/WTO is assumed to be
to help members out of a Prisoners’ Dilemma-like situation. By necessity, the agreement is
incomplete in that it does not include any explicit bindings of internal measures with trade
incidence, but leaves these to be unilaterally determined by the members.
The purpose of the paper is to capture salient features of NT as it is interpreted in the
context of the GATT. Section 3 very brieﬂy summarizes the main elements of the text and
the case law on NT in the GATT as it applies to taxation. Formalizing the law is not a
trivial task, since the language of Art. III is vague, and the case law lacks transparency,
logic and consistency. But a reading of the text and case law of Art. III suggests that it can
reasonably be interpreted as stipulating a strict standard, according to which the taxation of
foreign products should not exceed that on highly substitutable domestic products, regardless
of what might motivate diﬀerential taxation. Our main concern is whether such a strict
standard is likely to improve the eﬃciency of a trade agreement?
Section 4 analyzes implications of NT for given tariﬀs. It shows that a marginally binding
6NT provision will indeed support an agreement on tariﬀ reductions, and increase government
welfare. But it also argues that NT may reduce welfare if made more restrictive. Section
4 also considers the impact of strict NT in a standard type of incomplete contract setting,
where tariﬀs are negotiated before countries unilaterally determine internal taxes, and where
trade negotiators are fully forward-looking. It is shown that NT indeed enhances government
w e l f a r ei nt h i sc o n t e x t .
The limitations of strict NT are discussed in Section 5. As shown, a strict NT stan-
dard cannot be expected to fully resolve the incomplete contract problem, even under the
ideal circumstances of perfectly forward-looking trade negotiators. It is also argued that,
in practice, there is a fundamental problem with NT as a solution to the incomplete con-
tracting problem, in that it puts unreasonable demands on negotiators’ understanding of the
economic consequences of tariﬀ agreements.
Section 6 brieﬂy examines whether the General Exceptions clause in Art. XX GATT is
likely to reduce the ineﬃciencies caused by the rigid nature of strict NT to any important
extent. It is concluded that while it is likely to improve matters, it will not entirely solve
the problem.
A couple of remarks on the incomplete contracting model are oﬀered in Section 7, and
Section 8 very brieﬂy summarizes the main ﬁndings.
2 The economic framework
Let there be two countries, Home and Foreign. Home produces a good X and imports a close
substitute Y from Foreign. Home also exports a good to Foreign which is closely related to a
g o o dp r o d u c e di nF o r e i g n .T h eH o m eg o v e r n m e n tl e v i e sa ni m p o r tt a r i ﬀ τ,and internal sales
taxes r and s, where r is the tax on the domestic product, and s the tax on the imported
product. The total tax burden on the imported product is thus t = s + τ. Foreign country
7variables are in a standard fashion distinguished by a “*”, so that the corresponding tariﬀ
and tax levels are τ∗,r ∗, s∗ and t∗.4
Government welfare is taken to be additively separable in welfare derived from domestic
sources and exports. For the Home country government, it is written as






The function V (r,t) represents welfare derived from domestic sources, including welfare in
the form of consumer and producer surplus, government revenue, etc., as well as possible
disutility from consumption externalities. Government welfare derived from the export mar-
ket Π(r∗,t ∗) could, for instance, result from proﬁts made abroad, or the political payoﬀ from
the employment generated by exports; for simplicity, we will stick to the former interpreta-
tion. Proﬁts in the Foreign market depend on the total taxation in the Foreign country, and
it is assumed that a Foreign tax on its domestic product increases Home country proﬁts,
that taxation of the Home country exports reduces proﬁts, and an equal increase on both
products reduces export earnings:
Πr∗ > 0, Πt∗ < 0, Πr∗ + Πt∗ < 0, (1)
with a symmetric condition for Foreign proﬁt si nt h eH o m em a r k e t .T h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e r
of market structures that would be compatible with this setup. For instance, this could be
4 More generally, taxes and tariﬀs could be speciﬁco rad valorem (disregarding cases where
one tax is of one type and the other of the other type), and the internal tax could be levied on
the price of the foreign product inclusive or exclusive of the tariﬀ.T h e s e v e r a l d i ﬀerent possible
constellations can be divided into two groups. In the ﬁrst, the total tax on a foreign product is τ +s
(as assumed here). This would arise when both taxes and the tariﬀ are speciﬁc, or when both taxes
and the tariﬀ are ad valorem with taxes levied net of the tariﬀ. In the second type of situation,
matters are more involved. For instance, with ad valorem tariﬀs and taxes, and with taxes levied
on the price inclusive of the tariﬀ,t h et o t a lt a xi sτ + s(1 + τ). The resulting interaction between
the tax and the tariﬀ in this second type of situation does not seem to be of ﬁrst-hand interest to
the issues at stake.
8an international oligopoly selling the same homogenous or (slightly) diﬀerentiated product in
two segmented markets, Home and Foreign. Or, the products could be sold under conditions
of perfect competition.










where W∗(r,t,r∗,t ∗) is the Foreign government welfare. To ensure interior solutions to the
governments’ decision problems, and their bargaining problem, we will follow the literature
and simply assume that the bargaining and maximization problems involved have unique
interior solutions. In particular, it is assumed that W and WG are strictly concave in (r,t),
and that W∗ and WG are strictly concave in (r∗,t ∗). An “own eﬀects dominate” assumption
will also be made, in that an equally small increase in both taxes will be taken to reduce the
marginal tax impacts Wr and Wt:
Wir + Wit < 0; i = r,t. (2)
As u ﬃcient condition for this to hold is that Wrt < 0, given the assumed concavity of W.
Finally, a standard two-stage game approach is employed to capture the incompleteness
of the contract. In the ﬁrst stage, countries may form a trade agreement including tariﬀ
bindings, and possibly an NT provision. Governments’ ability to commit to such an agree-
ment is taken for granted throughout. In the second stage, countries unilaterally decide on
their internal taxes, possibly constrained by an NT provision.
The assumption that governments can impose sales taxes on foreign products that com-
pletely mimic tariﬀs, unless constrained by an NT provision, may seem extreme. However,
5 In the special case where the countries’ reservation welfare levels are the same, an agreement
will plausibly maximize the joint welfare of the two governments. For instance, suppose the outcome
is given by Nash bargaining solution, with a common level of government welfare ¯ w in status quo.
T h es o l u t i o nw i t hr e g a r dt oa n yt a r i ﬀ or tax µ is given by maxµ (W(µ) − ¯ w)(W∗(µ) − ¯ w), which





is, the solution maximizes the aggregate welfare WG.
9a discriminatory sales tax would seem to be very easy to administer, and would not violate
any provision of the GATT absent Art. III, and it is therefore natural to take this as the
no-NT benchmark.6
It can also be noted that the assumed separability in the government welfare function
implicitly assumes that the framework is one of partial equilibrium, contrary to what is
assumed in much of the literature on trade agreements. This has an obvious drawback in that
it neglects general equilibrium ramiﬁcations of trade agreements, which should be expected
to be important at least when trade agreements are formed between asymmetric countries.
On the other hand, the notion that trade negotiators take account of such eﬀects, is also
highly problematic, as a depiction of actuality. The partial equilibrium assumption obviously
simpliﬁes matters analytically since it implies each country’s unilaterally optimal total tax
rates are independent of the tax levels in the other country. Such strategic interaction
between taxes would complicate the analysis, but does not seem to be of primary importance
for the issues at stake here.
2.1 The problem NT is to address
In the absence of any form of agreement, countries will choose tariﬀsa n dt a x e ss oa st o
max
r,s,τ W(r,s + τ;·).
An internal solution to this problem, denoted (ru,t u), is hence given by
Wr(r,s + τ)=0
Wt(r,s + τ)=0 ,
6 It is also possible that this is prevented by other provisions in the agreement. The GATT
does contain a legal instrument that might possibly be used against such behavior — “non-violation
complaint”. This instrument will be discussed below.
10with a symmetric condition for the foreign country. For NT to potentially have a role to
play, the focus is on situations where it is optimal from a unilateral point of view to levy a
higher total tax on foreign than on domestic products, i.e., where ru <t u.
Suppose that countries instead form an agreement on tariﬀs, leaving taxes unregulated.
With tariﬀs set at some level ˆ τ during trade negotiations, the taxes will be set so as to
max
r,s W(r,s +ˆ τ;·).
Since the purpose of the tariﬀ bargaining is to reduce the total taxation of the imported
product, it will not be optimal to set τ>t u in the tariﬀ negotiation stage. It is immediately
seen that as long as 0 ≤ ˆ τ ≤ tu, the total taxation of the two products will be identical to
the case absent the trade agreement, since for any tariﬀ τ, t h et a xo nt h ei m p o r t e dp r o d u c t
will be set such that s = tu − τ, and r = ru. Therefore, any agreement on tariﬀsw i l lb e
completely undone by adjustments in the tax on foreign products:
Observation 1 At a r i ﬀ agreement has no impact absent some form of regulation of domestic
taxation.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h eP r i s o n e r s ’D i l e m m a - l i k ep r o b l e mi sn o tc o n ﬁned to tariﬀs is, of course,
analytically completely trivial. But it highlights the fact that the eﬃciency of the instruments
included in the trade agreements to counter these problem is central to the outcome of such
agreements. Virtually the whole literature on trade agreements has implicitly assumed that the
agreements under study contain mechanisms entirely oﬀsetting the incentives to use internal
instruments for protectionist purposes. A central purpose of this paper is to examine whether
NT, as it appears in the GATT, is likely to achieve this, and if not, what type of ineﬃciencies
should be expected. To this end, we must ﬁrst establish the salient features of the law.
113 Art. III GATT
The passages of direct relevance to taxation in Art. III are the following:
III.1 The Members recognize that internal taxes ... should not be applied to
imported or domestic products so as to aﬀord protection to domestic production.
III.2 ...[Imported products] shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly
or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall
otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic
products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
Finally, there is an Interpretative Note to the last sentence:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the ﬁrst sentence of paragraph 2 would
be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only
in cases where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed
product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product
which was not similarly taxed.
The interpretation of Art. III is far from obvious. During the WTO era, adjudicating
bodies have discussed Art. III.2 in the context of four disputes, and the three disputes
with more substantial discussions all concerned alleged discriminatory taxation of alcoholic
beverages. In all four disputes, the taxation was ruled to violate Art. III.7 The discussion
by the adjudicating bodies in these reports is often confusing and seemingly contradictory.
But the reports are fairly consistent on certain points.
7 These disputes are discussed in detail in Horn and Mavroidis (2004).
12First, the concepts of “like” and “directly competitive or substitutable” (DCS) are inter-
preted as referring to demand substitutability, as indicated by econometric or, more com-
monly, non-econometric evidence.8 Like product pairs have in the case law been interpreted
as a strict subset of the set of DCS product pairs. Adjudicating bodies have also repeatedly
emphasized that a high degree of proximity is needed for likeness.
The implementation of Art. III might be expected to be substantially complicated by a
desire to distinguish between protectionist and legitimate reasons for discriminatory taxation.
Indeed, the ﬁrst paragraph restricts the attention to situations where Members use their
domestic policy instruments “so as to aﬀord protection”, which can be read to refer to
an intent to discriminate. But, and this is a second consistent theme in the case law, the
adjudicating bodies have categorically dismissed intent as relevant. For instance, in a central
Art. III.2 dispute, the WTO Appellate Body states that9
...[i]t is not necessary for a panel to sort through the many reasons legislators
and regulators often have for what they do and weigh the relative signiﬁcance of
those reasons to establish legislative or regulatory intent...
The case law has instead consistently argued that the substantial obligation in Art. III as it
concerns taxation, is expressed in the second paragraph of Art. III, and the requirement is
simply that there should be no taxation “in excess” in the case of like products.10 Conversely,
any taxation in excess is considered to be “so as to aﬀord protection” in the case of like
products.
8The notion of “like” is in case law more generally, not always interpreted as reﬂecting solely properties
of demand.
9 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS11/AB/R, 4 October 1996).
10 Matters are more complicated when it comes to DCS products, however. The text here
explicitly refers back to Art. III.1, which contains the central concept “so as to aﬀord protection”.
The case law has been extremely vague on the interpretation of this term. But it seems to view any
tax diﬀerential by more than a de minimis amount (the magnitude of which is yet to be determined)
as illegal under Art. III.
13Third, and related to the second point, Art. III applies to taxation of products and not
product characteristics. To see the importance of this, consider for a moment the case where
the products are associated with a number of “policy-relevant characteristics” k1,...,kn.
Diﬀerences between the two products in how they contribute to these consequences then
create incentives for diﬀerential national tax treatment. Some of these reasons may be
legitimate also from a global eﬃciency point of view, while some may be of a beggar-thy-
neighbor nature.11 Let αi (α∗
i) denote the contribution per unit of X (Y ) to consequence i.
Assume that the governments can impose linear internal taxes on these characteristics; let
the Home country tax on characteristic i be denoted qH
i per unit of i for the Home product
and qF
i for the imported product, and let qH and qF denote the vector of the respective



















A c c o r d i n gt oc a s el a w , it does not suﬃce that tax vectors qH and qF are identical, in
which case the tax scheme would be de jure non-discriminatory, since it would not make
tax distinctions according to national origin. Art. III also covers de facto discriminatory
schemes, i.e., origin-neutral schemes yielding higher taxation of foreign products by taxing
11 Themodel laid out in the previous section is compatible with this richer framework, at least as
long these consequences depend on volumes X and Y :
ki = ˆ Ki(X(r,t),Y(r,t))
≡ Ki(r,t).
The function V could then be assumed to subsume these diﬀerent product features, with V (r,t) ≡
˜ V (K1(r,t),...,Kn(r,t)).
14certain product characteristics higher than other; that is, Art. III also applies to taxes such
that qH
i = qF
i for all i, as long as R(qH) <S (qF).
The reason for letting the ambit of Art. III include de facto discrimination can easily be
seen: if such discrimination were not covered, a government could achieve any desired level
of taxation of the two products by an appropriate choice of the common vector (q1,...,qn)
as long as the number of distinguishable characteristics is at least as large as the number of
products among which the government makes tax distinctions (disregarding non-negativity
c o n s t r a i n t so nt a x e s ) .T h ee c o n o m i ci m p l i c a t i o no fl e t t i n gt h ea m b i to fA r t .I I Ii n c l u d ede
facto discrimination is that only total internal taxation matters (levels r and s), while the
structure of vector q is immaterial (as long as the intent behind measures is not taken into
account under Art. III).
In sum, Art. III implies a strict standard: do not levy higher internal taxation on
imported products than on domestically produced products, regardless of the motive. In
terms of the model laid out above, NT requires the importing Home country to ensure s ≤ r
in its internal taxation — what we will refer to as “strict NT”.
The strict NT standard might seem to impose an unwarranted restriction on countries’
sovereignty to regulate the domestic economy, by disallowing members to tax foreign prod-
ucts more heavily than domestic like products, even if foreign products are legitimately of
more concern from a regulatory point of view. But it should be recalled that internal taxation
is part of a larger tax scheme also including trade taxes. Countries have complete freedom
when negotiating their tariﬀ bindings to maintain high tariﬀs on imports associated with
negative externalities. The NT provision only requires that once the tariﬀ levels are deter-
mined through negotiations, internal taxation is not used to undo what has been negotiated.
Consequently, in order to evaluate the impact of NT on the ability to pursue regulatory
15objectives, we have to take account of any interplay between NT and tariﬀ setting.12
4 The virtue of NT
This section focuses on the upside of strict NT, establishing how it might under certain
circumstances deliver the desired stabilization of the negotiated outcome. To this end, we
start by considering its impact for constant tariﬀs, and then let the tariﬀsb ed e t e r m i n e d
through negotiations.
4.1 NT with constant tariﬀs
Consider for a moment an NT restriction of the form s ≤ r + n, where n ≥ 0 parametrizes
the degree of strictness of the standard. The restriction will bind for n<t u − ru − τ, and
captures a strict NT standard when n =0 . Assuming that it binds, the Home country tax
problem is
max
r,s W(r,s + τ;·) (3)
s.t. s = r + n.
The ﬁrst-order condition
Wr(r,r + n + τ,·)+Wt(r,r + n + τ,·)=0 (4)
then deﬁnes the optimal tax r = R(m), where m ≡ n + τ and m ≤ tu − ru. This expression
shows the basic mechanism of the NT provision, which is to make taxes blunter instruments
of protection, by making it impossible to tax the imported product independently of the
domestic product. Put diﬀerently, NT introduces a distortion from the point of view of
12 There is another provision — Art. XX GATT — that might soften this strict stance. We will
return to this Article below.
16national policy making. It reduces the possibility of discriminating for beggar-thy-neighbor
motives, but also of addressing problems of legitimate policy concern associated with im-
ported products. This has to be set against the gain created by NT through increased market
access abroad.
As a measure of the eﬃcacy of NT, consider the eﬀect on aggregate government welfare
W +W∗ of an NT provision imposed on the Home country or, alternatively, the implication
for Home government welfare of NT being imposed on both Home and Foreign:
Proposition 1 The imposition of a marginally binding NT clause unambiguously increases
aggregate government welfare for a constant tariﬀ, regardless of the motive for the tax
discrimination. But a further tightening of the NT standard may reduce welfare.














Thus, there are two opposing eﬀect. There is a tendency for welfare in the domestic market
to fall (Wt(ru,t u) ≤ 0) while Foreign ﬁrms gain (dΠ∗/dn =( Π∗
r + Π∗
t)Rm > 0), unless they
are in a corner solution. Starting in a situation where the restriction just binds, Wt =0 ,
but there will be a positive ﬁrst-order eﬀe c tv i at h ei n c r e a s ei nΠ∗. For reductions in n
at R(m) >r u,W t < 0. This negative eﬀect may dominate the positive eﬀect on proﬁts
reaped by Foreign, depending e.g. on the magnitude of the latter, and the reason for the
discriminatory taxation.¥
Note, ﬁrst, that the welfare gain of a marginal tightening of NT does not stem from
reduced discrimination per se, but from the fact that in the absence of NT, the Home country
taxes are globally ineﬃcient. Thus, a marginal reduction in s and a marginal increase in r
would increase global welfare also when ru >s u and τ =0 , even though tax discrimination
would in this case increase. Hence, the existence of this gain does not depend on the degree
17of “legitimacy” of the regulation, but stems from the basic neglect of foreign interests in
national tax setting.
Second, the Proposition argues that it is indeed possible that the gains created by NT
in terms of market access in foreign markets may be dwarfed by losses from the reduced
ability to target distortions in the domestic market. This seems very much in line with the
above-mentioned critique of the WTO. Thus, there are indeed reasons to be concerned with
the welfare implications of strict NT.
Proposition 1 presumes tariﬀst ob ec o n s t a n t .B u tt h ep u r p o s eo ft h ep r o v i s i o ni st og i v e
more bite to a tariﬀ agreement and therefore, we turn to its impact on tariﬀ negotiations.
4.2 NT with forward-looking tariﬀ negotiations
Equation (4) determines the tax on the domestic product as a function R of the tariﬀ,f o ra
strict NT standard (n =0 ) . Diﬀerentiation yields:
Rτ = −
Wtt + Wtr







where the signs follow from (2). Hence, a reduction in the tariﬀ leads the importing country
to increase the tax on the foreign product, but by less than the full amount of the tariﬀ
reduction, since the tax increase will also apply to domestic products due to NT.
It was argued above that for constant tariﬀs, the imposition of a marginally binding NT
provision increases global welfare, but that a strict NT standard may or may not, depending
on the motive for the tax discrimination. But matters are diﬀerent with fully forward-looking
tariﬀ negotiators, as long as the negotiated outcome fulﬁlls the eﬃciency property that a
small change away from the negotiated outcome would have ﬁrst-order impacts on the welfare
of both governments:
Proposition 2 The inclusion of strict NT in a tariﬀ agreement reduces the total taxation
18of the foreign product, increases the taxation of the domestic product, and increases the
welfare of both parties, when tariﬀ negotiators take full account of the impact of the
agreement on subsequent tax setting.
Proof: There are no incentives to set tariﬀss u c ht h a tτ>t u, since this would create too high
taxation of the foreign product. For any tu ≥ τ ≥ tu − ru ≡ ¯ τ, the importing country can
choose its unilaterally optimal tax on the imported product unconstrained by NT, since it
can achieve the total tax level tu on imported products with an NT compatible tax (s ≤ ru).
The outcome will thus be the same as with no NT. To see the incentive to set τ<¯ τ,n o t e





r Rτ + W
∗
t [1 + Rτ] < 0,
where the sign follows from W∗
r > 0,R τ < 0,W ∗
t < 0, and 1+Rτ > 0. Such a situation
is ineﬃcient. Letting superscript “n” denote an equilibrium value with negotiations taking
place under strict NT, the negotiated tariﬀ will therefore feature τn <τ u. Consequently,
rn = R(τn) >R (¯ τ)=ru, and tn = R(τn)+τn <R (tu − ru)+tu − ru = tu. The strictly
positive welfare impact follows from the fact that the eﬃcient outcome diﬀers from ¯ τ.¥
The Proposition thus establishes a benchmark case when a strict NT standard increases
the welfare of the parties to the agreement by protecting a tariﬀ agreement from being
completely undermined by subsequent opportunistic tax changes. In particular, strict NT
h a st h i sb e n e ﬁcial consequence even if it would be desirable to let internal taxes target
distortions caused by foreign products.
The “mechanics” of this result are straightforward: strict NT essentially shifts the re-
sponsibility to address regulatory problems from the unilateral tax setting stage to the earlier
tariﬀ negotiations. As a result, any negative (or positive) externalities that would arise from
the tax setting are internalized in the negotiations. This solution to the incomplete contract
problem has a certain beauty in the simplicity of its implementation: there is no need for
19o u t s i d ea d j u d i c a t o r st od e t e r m i n et h et r u ep r e f e r e n c e so ft h er e g u l a t i n gc o u n t r y ,e t c . . A l l
that is required is to compare the total amount of taxation of the two products.
4.2.1 On the structure of tariﬀsa n dt a x e s
The inclusion of NT in the trade agreement has some implications that may, at ﬁrst, appear
somewhat surprising, even though they are easily understood at closer scrutiny. First, even
though strict NT leads to a lower total taxation of foreign products, it does not follow
that negotiated tariﬀs are necessarily lower than they would be absent NT. The precise
manner in which taxes and tariﬀsa r ea ﬀected by a tariﬀ agreement comprising NT depends
on the “division of labor” between tariﬀs and taxes at the outset. For instance, suppose
that non-discriminatory taxes are used already before the trade agreement is implemented
(r = s = ru, and τ = tu − ru). The tariﬀ will then fall as a result of the trade agreement,
and the internal taxation of both products increases. On the other hand, if taxes are the
only means of protection at the outset (r = ru,s= tu,a n dτ =0 ) , NT will be binding with
the trade agreement, so that r = s = rn, and τ = tn − rn > 0.T h et a r i ﬀ will then increase
as a result of the trade agreement, since it also constrains taxation.13
Corollary 1 A trade agreement including a strict NT provision does not necessarily reduce
tariﬀs, but reduces the total taxation of imported products.
This feature is more general than the particular formalization of NT in this paper, following
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a tat r a d ea g r e e m e n tm u s ti n c l u d eN Tt ob ee ﬀective. As a result, the
agreement is not only an agreement on tariﬀs, but also on taxes. The impact of the agreement
on tariﬀst h e r e f o r ed e p e n d so nh o wt a x e sa n dt a r i ﬀs would be set in a situation without an
agreement.
13 Trade negotiations within already existing agreements, such as the rounds in the GATT/WTO,
would lead to reduced tariﬀs.
20Second, NT tends to separate the responsibility for addressing externality problems ac-
cording to their sources. When problems stem from domestic products, internal taxation can
be used to correct for any distortions, since a higher taxation of domestic than of imported
products is legal. On the other hand, when problems mainly stem from imported products,
tariﬀsm u s tb er e l i e du p o n .T os e et h ei m p l i c a t i o nt h e r e o ff o rt a x a t i o n ,s u p p o s et h a tt h e r e
is a negative externality from consumption of the imported product, the severity of which
increases in a parameter k (it will be more precisely interpreted below). The equilibrium tax
c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e na sr = R(k,τ(k)). For a given tariﬀ level, there will be a direct eﬀect of
the externality on the internal taxes: typically, the more severe it is, the higher will be the
common tax to counter the problem. But the severity of the externality problem will also
aﬀect the incentives of trade negotiators. If a worsened externality increases the tariﬀ (which
seems plausible), this will yield a tendency for the common tax to fall, thus counteracting
the direct eﬀect and making the total eﬀect indeterminate.
In order to obtain more determinate results, a simple linear version of the model is
employed, in which countries are mirror images of each other. In each of the two markets,
there is a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm producing a possibly diﬀerentiated product in volumes
x and y, respectively, at zero marginal costs, and competing in Cournot fashion. There is
also an outside good consumed in quantity h. Consumer welfare and product demand are
based on a utility function U(x,y)+h, where U is quadratic









with b ≥ 0 measuring the substitutability between products. Governments are assumed
to maximize social welfare, consisting of the sum of consumer welfare, proﬁts of Home
ﬁrms earned in the Home and the Foreign market, and government revenue, and minus a
negative externality that is linear in the import volume ky.T h et a xr c a nt h e nb es e e na s
an environmental tax that for reasons of NT has to be be uniform across products. The
21following is established in the Appendix:
Observation 2 In the linear model, the more prone to damage the environment is the im-
ported product (the higher is k), the lower is the environmental tax r under NT.
This feature stems from the fact that the environmental problem is taken account of
in the tariﬀ negotiation stage. A worsening of the externality problem shifts the optimal
consumption and production mix away from imports toward the domestically produced good.
To achieve this, the tax on the latter product is reduced, but this also requires a reduction
of the tax on the imported product due to NT. The total taxation of the imported product
is therefore increased through a more than compensating increase in the tariﬀ.
Observation 2 is interesting from the point of view of the policy debate. Not only does the
trade agreement increase imports, and thus possible negative externalities associated with
imports. It will also be the case that in a cross-section of otherwise identical industries, the
NT requirement implies that there will be lower environmental taxation, the worse imports
are from an environmental point of view. While economically logical, the virtue of such an
arrangement is likely to be a hard sell in the policy debate.
4.3 NT and the Most-Favored Nation provision
In addition to NT, the GATT and the other agreements in the WTO, as well as many
other major trade agreements, comprise a Most-Favored Nation (MFN). NT and MFN are
complementary, in that the former addresses discriminatory internal measures while the
latter is concerned with border measures. But there are diﬀerences between the two. First,
NT has an important role to play already in the context of bilateral agreements, whereas
MFN only kicks in when there are at least three countries. Second, and more interesting, NT
introduces MFN-like features as a by-product, while the opposite does not seem to be the
case. To see this, consider NT in a case with three countries, A, B and C. Suppose that A
22imports a product from both B and C, and that it produces a product that is like to both the
imported products (the two foreign products need not necessarily be like products). Absent
an agreement on NT, A may want to tax the two imported products diﬀerently from the
domestic product. But, NT would imply that the product from C must also be awarded the
tax treatment awarded to the product from B.
Observation 3 NT tends to extend the MFN principle of equal treatment of trading partners
to also apply to internal policy measures.
5T h e l i m i t e d e ﬀectiveness of NT
Proposition 2 establishes circumstances under which a strict NT standard will unambiguously
increase welfare. But there are several obvious limitations to the eﬀectiveness of NT:
(1) NT does not put any discipline on domestic instruments in cases where there is no
like (or DCS) domestic product.
(2) NT is restricted to situations where countries would unconstrained set r<sand, as
ac o n s e q u e n c e ,i tw i l ln o th a v es u ﬃcient bite in cases where the domestic product should be
taxed more highly than the imported product.
(3) Proposition 2 requires that the tariﬀ can be fully adjusted to the restriction imposed
on the taxation of the foreign product. As argued above, if tariﬀs are not responsive, strict
NT may instead reduce welfare. Such a lack of responsiveness may arise if tariﬀ bindings
a r em a d ea tm o r ea g g r e g a t el e v e l st h a nt h o s ea tw h i c hd o m e s t i cr e g u l a t i o n( a n dt h u sN T )
operates, as is often the case. A tariﬀ line (the statistical deﬁnition of the set of products to
which a particular tariﬀ applies) typically comprises a number of similar, but not identical,
products and the extent of similarity under a tariﬀ heading is often insensitive to the extent
to which products are identical from a regulatory perspective. The welfare gains established
23in Proposition 2 are thus not assured in such cases.
But there are reasons to expect that strict NT will not completely resolve the incomplete
contracting problem even under the “ideal” circumstances assumed in Proposition 2, but
will lead to excessive taxation of both imported and domestically produced goods:
Proposition 3 There will be too high a level of total taxation of both the domestic and the
foreign product under strict NT from the point of view of aggregate welfare.
Proof: Let (re,t e) be the domestic taxes and tariﬀ maximizing aggregate welfare. For (re,t e)
to be implemented under NT, it must simultaneously be the case that R(τ)=re and








since at (re,t e)









with the inequality stemming from (1). The concavity of W(r,r +τe;·) in (r,t) then implies
that the unilaterally optimal response to τe must exceed re, R(τe) >r e, and thus that
T(τe)=R(τe)+τe >r e + τe = te.
If the trade agreement stipulates τ>τ e, then r = R(τ) <R (τe). But increasing τ to
the point where R(τ) <r e will not be welfare maximizing, since a reduction in τ would then
move both r and t in the right direction, as t = T(τ) >T(τe) >t e.H e n c e ,i tm u s tb et h e
case that r = R(τ) >r e and t = T(τ) >t e for any optimal τ ≥ τe.
If the agreement instead stipulates that τ<τ e, then t = T(τ) <T(τe). B u ti tc a n n o tb e
welfare maximizing to set τ so low that T(τ) <t e, since an increase in τ would then move
24both r and t in the desired direction, as r = R(τ) >R (τe) >r e. Hence, r = R(τ) >r e and
t = T(τ) >t e for any optimal τ<τ e.
I th a st h u sb e e ne s t a b l i s h e dt h a trn >r e and tn >t e.¥
Some intuition for this result may be obtained by consider the incentive for Home to set
taxes when constrained by NT, if the tariﬀ i ss e ta tt h el e v e lte − re. Through a common
tax re it could achieve (re,t e), but it would plausibly prefer a higher tax on the foreign
product, and/or a lower tax on the domestic product. This would violate NT, however. The
government therefore eﬀectively chooses between either a higher or a lower common tax than
re. The distinguishing feature of taxes (re,t e) is that they take account of foreign country
interests, and thus implicitly of the fact that the foreign country beneﬁts from a general
lowering of the tax level (a change dr = dt < 0). Lacking this incentive, the importing
government prefers a higher general tax level.
Several comments are in order:
(1) Propositions 2 and 3 jointly imply that NT will tend to force the total taxation of
the foreign product in the right direction by reducing it below tu, but that it will not get it
down to the desirable level te,t h a ti s ,te <t n <t u. Since ru >r e will not arise here, NT will
tend to change the tax on domestic products in the right direction, but will “overshoot” the
target, so that ru <r e <r n.
(2) It should be emphasized that the fact that NT does not completely resolve the
incomplete contract problem is at odds with much of the existing literature on the trade
agreements, and the GATT in particular. Since it is very hard to defend the assumption
that countries do not have access to domestic taxes that can closely substitute for tariﬀs
absent NT, this literature seems based on the assumption that NT painlessly solves the
problem in the background. But Proposition 3 suggests that this may a highly questionable
assumption.
25(3) A noteworthy implication of Proposition 3 and the fact that R(τ) >r e and T(τ) >t e
for any optimal τ<τ e, is that the tension between trade and tax liberalization will not be
entirely eradicated under NT:
Corollary 2 Strict NT will not implement zero total taxation when this is globally desirable
(re = te =0 ) . Both internal taxes would be strictly positive if a zero tariﬀ were agreed
upon in such a case.
(4) There are reasons to suspect that strict NT would be less beneﬁcial from a gov-
ernment welfare point of view than suggested by Proposition 2. The gains established in
this Proposition stem from the internalization by negotiators of externalities from tax set-
ting. However, this requires that negotiators can perfectly foresee the consequences of their
agreement for future taxation. Given the complexity of the issues at stake, there are strong
reasons to believe that, in practice, negotiators will not be able to be fully forward-looking
in the assumed sense. As a result, the welfare implications are likely to be worse than those
established there, given the assumed form of the contract.
Observation 4 There is an inherent practical problem with strict NT as a solution to the
incomplete contracting problem, in that it shifts the responsibility for regulation to
negotiators who presumably have a limited capacity to take regulatory concerns into
account in their tariﬀ setting.
6 Other provisions in the GATT with potential rele-
vance to NT
Art. III is only one of many provisions in the GATT, and when assessing the implications of
the GATT as a whole, we have to take account of other provisions that might mitigate the
adverse sides of NT. We will here discuss two such instruments, and just mention a third.
266.1 Art. XX GATT exceptions
Proposition 3 establishes that strict NT will typically not implement a ﬁrst-best outcome.
One reason is clearly that it will not allow higher taxation of foreign products, even when
this is desirable from a national and a global eﬃciency point of view. But the GATT contains
a provision that may reduce the likelihood for such ineﬃciencies to arise: Art. XX contains
an exhaustive list of General Exceptions applicable to any other Article in the Agreement,
and hence also to Art. III. From a regulatory point of view, the probably most interesting
grounds for exceptions are the following (emphasis added):
...Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ...
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement....
For a tax measure to be exempted under Art. XX, it must hence pass two tests — it should
be “necessary” to achieve one of the objectives on the Art. XX list, and it should not be
“disguised protection”. It may seem as if Art. XX should signiﬁcantly soften the strict
standard imposed by Art. III. However, it is not clear to what extent this will be the
case due to the meagre case law. In particular, Art. XX was not invoked in any of the
four taxation disputes referred to above. But it has repeatedly been interpreted in Art. III.4
cases during the WTO era — Art. III.4 addresses discriminatory internal measures other than
27taxation. The typical meaning given to the crucial term “necessary” is that of “least trade
restrictive”, a concept playing a central role in GATT/WTO case law in general. It seems
plausible that the same interpretation would be applied in taxation cases. The “least trade
restrictive” concept has occasionally been qualiﬁed with the additional term “reasonably
available”. But case law has not given any clearer meaning to this latter term so far.14
The interpretation of “necessary” as “least trade restrictive” may have very far-reaching
consequences, if taken seriously. To see this, let us make a couple of more speciﬁc assumptions
concerning how the sales volumes of the two products depend on their total taxation. Let
the tax on the domestic product decrease sales of this product X(r,t) and increases the sales
of the Foreign product Y (r,t), and conversely for the total tax on the Foreign product:
Xr < 0; Xt > 0; Yr > 0; Yt < 0.
Furthermore, let total sales fall as the result of a tax increase,
Xi + Yi < 0; i = r,t
and assume that an equally large increase in either r or s reduce both X and Y ,
Xr + Xt < 0,Y r + Yt < 0
Also, let there be a policy variable k = ˜ K(X(r,t),Y(r,t)) ≡ K(r,s + τ),w i t h ˜ KX ≥ 0 and
˜ KY ≥ 0, deﬁned such that a lower level corresponds to higher government welfare, ceteris
paribus. We can then make the following natural deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 (Necessary) A pair of taxes (r,s) such that r<sis “necessary” to achieve
the level k = K(r,s + τ) if @ (r0,s 0) s.t. (i) r0 ≥ r and s0 ≤ s; (ii) Y (r0,s 0 + τ) >
Y (r,s + τ); and (iii) K(r0,s 0 + τ) ≤ K(r,s + τ).
14 The only more concrete determination of which we are aware is that administrative costs asso-
ciated with alternative, less discriminatory measures do not necessarily make them “unreasonable”.
28That is, the taxes are necessary if there is no less discriminatory way of achieving at least as
low a level of the externality, while admitting more imports. Disregarding the “reasonably
available” qualiﬁcation due to its unclear practical relevance, the case law interpretation of
t h eN To b l i g a t i o ni nG A T T ,w h i c hi n v o l v e sb o t hA r t .I I Ia n dA r t .X X ,c o u l db ef o r m a l l y
summarized as:
Deﬁnition 2 (III+XX) Any pair of taxes (r,s) such that r<sis illegal if the stated
objective k is not on the Art. XX list, or if the taxes are not “necessary” to achieve
the level K(r,s) of this objective.
At a ﬁrst glance, this might appear rather permissive, allowing countries to choose what-
ever level of the policy objective (on the Art. XX list) they want; all it requires is that this
level is implemented in the most import-friendly manner possible. However, consider a case
where the alleged objective of a measure is on the Art. XX list and where hence, a higher tax
on the foreign product could potentially be allowed and a discriminatory pair of taxes ˆ r<ˆ s
are imposed to attain a level ˆ k ≡ K(ˆ r,ˆ s).A ni n c r e a s ei nr to ˆ s would reduce X and increase
Y, and reduce total consumption. If the externality problem were to be reduced, we would
have established that the pair (ˆ r,ˆ s) is not “necessary”. However, if the negative externality
is primarily associated with the foreign product, it might worsen as a result of this increase in
r. If so, increasing both taxes with the same amount, the consumption of both products will
fall, and increasing the taxes to ¯ s,d e ﬁned by K(¯ s, ¯ s) ≡ ˆ k, a non-discriminatory scheme with
the same level of the externality, but with more imports, is achieved.15 Hence, according to
the logic of the necessity test, if the country wanted to achieve the level of externality ˆ z, both
taxes should be set to ¯ s.C o n s e q u e n t l y , d i ﬀerential taxation would according to economic
logic eﬀectively be illegal due to the “least trade restrictive” interpretation of “necessary”.
15For instance, suppose the externality is K(r,s) ≡ αX(r,s)+Y (r,s). Then, with ¯ s>ˆ s>ˆ r, Y(ˆ r,ˆ s) −
Y (¯ s, ¯ s)=α[X(ˆ r,ˆ s) − x(¯ s, ¯ s)] >α [X(ˆ s, ˆ s) − x(¯ s, ¯ s)] > 0.
29The point here is not to argue that in practice, adjudicating bodies will go as far as always
dismissing any request for an Art. XX exemption in an Art. III.2 dispute. However, it does
seem plausible that the “least trade restrictive” interpretation of the necessity requirement
does constrain the use of Art. XX to at least some degree, and that Art. XX will therefore
not entirely solve the problem to which strict NT is likely to give rise.16
6.2 Non-violation complaints
The paper builds on the notion that the purpose of NT in the GATT is to restrict the
incentives for the parties to opportunistically exploit the incompleteness of the agreement.
A standard incomplete contracting framework has been employed to study the impact of this
restriction, a framework in which negotiators are fully forward-looking when setting tariﬀs,
being able to foresee how the tariﬀ will aﬀect future tax setting, while at the same time they
a r eu n a b l et oa c h i e v eaﬁrst-best outcome. This framework seems to be the natural starting
point for analyzing the role and impact of NT, but it is not unproblematic. If taken literally,
it seems to imply that the contracting problem can be given much more direct and eﬀective
solution.
To illustrate, consider the intuitively plausible argument that negotiators are unable at
the time of contracting, to foresee the consequences of a tariﬀ agreement for future regulatory
needs, and let this be formally captured by the assumption that the parties behave myopically
during the tariﬀ negotiations, treating taxes as given. Suppose that there is no NT obligation
in the trade agreement, but instead a provision requiring that “the parties to this Agreement
should set internal taxes to their ﬁrst-best levels”. This contract would actually achieve
the ﬁrst-best despite the myopia on part of negotiators provided that an adjudicator could
16 Certain measures concerning the protection of human, animal or plant life may primarily fall
under the SPS Agreement rather than the GATT. Determining the exact boundary between the
two would take the discussion too far into unchartered legal territory.
30perfectly determine the state of nature ex post: the role of tax setting would then essentially
be to correct the taxation resulting from tariﬀ setting, in order to achieve a ﬁrst-best outcome.
Any other taxes would be detected by the adjudicator as violating the suggested provision.17
There would consequently be no need for an NT provision, nor for any ex ante tariﬀ binding.
This reasoning suggests that some form of limitation on ex post veriﬁcation lies at the
heart of the existence of the GATT. But the agreement does contain in Art. XXIII a provision
that at least superﬁcially resembles the suggested obligation. This article, which speciﬁes
the grounds for a potentially successful complaint in the GATT, distinguishes between two
basic types of complaints: First, violations of speciﬁc provisions are obviously grounds for
legitimate complaints; such “violation complaints” constitute the vast majority of complaints
17 Formally, assume that the outcome of the latter negotiation is given by the solution to a
bargaining problem
max
τ,τ∗ B(ro,s o + τ,r∗o,s ∗o + τ∗),
where ro and so are arbitrary levels of taxation, taken as given during tariﬀ negotiations. Let the
solution to
Bj(ro,s o + τ,r∗o,s ∗o + τ∗)=0 ; j = t,t∗
deﬁne τ(ro,s o,r∗o,s ∗o) and τ∗(ro,s o,r∗o,s ∗o). Under the proposed provision, taxes will then in the
second stage be set so as to
max
r,s,r∗,s∗ B(r,s + τ(ro,s o,r∗o,s ∗o),r∗o,s ∗o + τ∗(ro,s o,r∗o,s ∗o)).
The associated ﬁrst-order conditions deﬁne the tax levels (˜ r,˜ s, ˜ r∗, ˜ s∗):
Bj(˜ r,˜ s + τ(ro,s o,r∗o,s ∗o), ˜ r∗, ˜ s∗ + τ∗(ro,s o,r∗o,s ∗o)) = 0; j = r,r∗,t,t ∗.
The solution for the case where taxes are negotiated simultaneously with tariﬀsi sg i v e nb y
Bj(ˆ r,ˆ t, ˆ r∗,ˆ t∗)=0 ; j = r,r∗,t,t ∗.
Hence, ˆ r =˜ r, ˆ r∗ =˜ r∗ and
ˆ t =˜ s + τ(ro,s o,r∗o,s ∗o)
ˆ t∗ =˜ s∗ + τ∗(ro,s o,r∗o,s ∗o).
Thus, it does not matter whether negotiators take into account the implications of the tariﬀsf o r
the taxes or not.
31in the WTO. The basic rule for such complaints is that the complaining country has the
burden to provide prima facie evidence of a violation. An alleged breach of Art. III hence
falls under this category. Second, a party can also ﬁle a complaint that a trading partner
has acted in a way that although not explicitly forbidden under the agreement, still violates
its spirit, a so called “non-violation complaint” (NVC). According to Art. XXIII, a valid
reason for a complaint is that a Member considers [emphasis added]
... that any beneﬁt accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement
is being nulliﬁed or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
Agreement is being impeded as the result of ... the application by another con-
tracting party of any measure, whether or not it conﬂicts with the provisions of
this Agreement, ...
The NVC instrument is closely related to NT in that they both target measures that are
not explicitly contracted. The NVC instrument is of a much more sweeping nature, however.
This raises the question of whether the NVC instrument essentially renders NT superﬂuous:
can any protectionist use of an internal instrument be attacked as denying the exporting
country what it could legitimately expect from the agreement? If interpreted this way, the
NVC instrument would closely resemble the provision suggested above. But, in practice,
NVCs have not been given such a sweeping interpretation. In the very few disputes during
the WTO era where adjudicating bodies have expressed their views on the requirements for
a valid NVCs, complainants have not succeeded in fulﬁlling the burden of proof. Complaints
concerning internal measures have instead almost invariably been based on alleged violations
of Art. III. The likely reason for this is the diﬃculty for adjudicators in determining what
parties could reasonably have expected when they signed the agreement. The burden of
proof has here fallen very heavily on the complaining country. Consequently, the NVC
instrument is not in practice a panacea for problems arising from incomplete contracting,
32and in particular, NT is not rendered redundant by this instrument.18
6.3 Art. XXVIII GATT renegotiations
Let us ﬁn a l l yv e r yb r i e ﬂy just mention another legal instrument that may mitigate the
ineﬃciencies from the strict NT. Art XXVIII allows members to renegotiate tariﬀ bindings
between rounds. Such a renegotiation requires that the country that wants to increase its
tariﬀ on a particular good, oﬀers “substantially equivalent” reductions on other tariﬀs. It
thus in principle opens a door for ex post adjustments of any adverse outcomes. But the
instrument has been used very sparsely in practice however (perhaps once per year during
the GATT and WTO eras).
7 Concluding remarks
International agreements on tariﬀs are meaningless, unless supported by some form of dis-
cipline on the use of internal measures. In all major trade agreements, this discipline is
provided by National Treatment provisions. The essential mechanism of NT is to make in-
ternal instruments blunter tools for protectionism. The purpose of this paper has been to
highlight some fundamental aspects of the NT obligation in the GATT/WTO, as it applies
to internal taxation. The starting point of the formal analysis was the case law interpretation
of Art. III as requiring a strict application of NT, which eﬀectively rules out any diﬀerential
taxation to the disadvantage of imported products.
T h em a i no b s e r v a t i o n sa r et h ef o l l o w i n g :
• Despite the rigidity of strict NT, it will improve government welfare even in cases
18See Bagwell and Staiger (2001), and Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2005) for more formal analyses of the
non-violation instrument.
33where a ﬁrst-best contract would call for discriminating against imported products, as
long as trade negotiators take account of how the tariﬀ agreement aﬀects subsequent
tax setting.
• Strict NT will not completely eradicate the problem caused by incomplete contracting
even under ideal circumstances. In particular, total taxation of both domestic and
imported products will be too high under strict NT.
• There is an inherent deﬁciency with strict NT as a solution to the incomplete contract-
ing problem in that it shifts the burden of regulating imported products back to trade
negotiators who, in practice, are unlikely to have suﬃcient foresight to fully internalize
the implications of a tariﬀ agreement for tax setting.
• The general exceptions clause in Art. XX softens the ambit of strict NT, but it is not
clear to what degree, since the case law is not well developed on this issue.
To conclude, Art. III as interpreted in case law, considerably restricts the possibility
of imposing higher taxation on foreign products than on their domestic counterparts, even
taking Art. XX exceptions into account. In this sense, the GATT/WTO is about more than
reductions of border barriers. However, this is not to say that the drawbacks of NT pointed
to necessarily dominate its positive aspects. Strict NT may still increase government welfare,
despite restricting countries’ freedom with respect to internal measures.
References
[1] Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger, 1999. An Economic Theory of GATT. American Eco-
nomic Review 89,2 1 5 - 2 4 8 .
34[2] Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger, 2001. “Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and In-
ternational Economic Institutions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2001, 116(2),
pp. 519-62.
[3]
[4] Copeland, B.R., 1990. Strategic Interaction among Nations: Negotiable and Non-
Battigalli, P. and G. Maggi, 2003. International Agreements on Product Standards:
An Incomplete-Contracting Theory. NBER Working Paper 9533, February.Negotiable
Trade Barriers. Canadian Journal of Economics 23, 84-108.
[5] Ederington, J., 2001. International Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies. Amer-
ican Economic Review 91, December, 1580-93.
[6] Ethier, W., J., 2002. Punishments and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements: The
Equivalent Withdrawal of Concessions. Mimeo.
[7] Horn, H, 2006. National Treatment in the GATT. American Economic Review 96 (forth-
coming).
[8] Horn, H., Maggi, G. and R.W. Staiger, 2005. The GATT/WTO as an Incomplete Con-
tract. Mimeo.
[9] Horn, H. and P.C. Mavroidis, 2004. Still Hazy after all these Years: The Interpretation of
GATT/WTO Case Law on Tax Discrimination. The European Journal of International
Law Vol. 15, No. 1.
[10] Pienaar, N., 2005. Economic Applications of the WTO Consistency Requirement. Chap-
ter 2 in Economic Applications of Product Quality Regulation in the WTO Trade Agree-
ments, Monograph Series No. 52, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stock-
holm University.
35A Appendix: The linear model
In each of two markets there is a domestic and a foreign ﬁrm producing a diﬀerentiated
product in volumes x and y, respectively, at zero marginal costs. There is also an outside
good consumed in the amount h by the representative consumer. The consumer’s welfare is:
ν = U(x,y)+h
where









With a unitary price for the outside good h, t h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti sh = I −px−qy, where
I is the exogenous consumer income (which is suﬃciently large to cover expenditures).
The demands are
X(p,q) ≡
1 − b + bq − p
1 − b2
Y (p,q) ≡
1 − b + bp − q
1 − b2




(2 − 2b +2 bpq − p
2 − q
2)
Inverse demands are on the standard form
p =1 − x − by
q =1 − bx − y
and the proﬁts are
π =( 1− x − by − r)x
π
∗ =( 1− bx − y − t)y
36Equilibrium given taxes and tariﬀs:
X(r,t) ≡
2 − b + bt − 2r
4 − b2
Y (r,t) ≡



















2(24 − 16b − 2b
2 +2 b
3 +( −8+8 b − 2b
2)r
+(−8+8 b − 2b
2)t +( 3 b
2 − 4)r




The two governments maximize national social welfare, measured as the sum of consumer
welfare, proﬁts at home and abroad, and government revenue, and also taking into account
an externality from imports. Hence, for the Home government
w = U +( I − px − qy)+( p − r)x + Π(r
∗,t
∗)+( rx+ ty) − ky






A.1 Optimal taxes under NT, for given tariﬀs
With binding NT, t = r + τ. We have that
dˆ U(r,r + τ)
dr
= −
bτ +2 br +2+2 r + τ
(b +2 )
2
(t − Q(r,t) − k)Y (r,t)=( t −
1
4 − b2(2 − b + br +2 t − b
2t) − k)(
2 − b + br − 2t
4 − b2 )
37d
dr
((r + τ − Q(r,r + τ) − k)Y (r,r + τ)) =
−4+2 b − 2br +4 r +4 τ − 4k + kb2
(b +2 )( −4+b2)
The optimal r under NT is thus given by
−
bτ +2 br +2+2 r + τ
(b +2 )
2 +
−4+2 b − 2br +4 r +4 τ − 4k + kb2









It is readily veriﬁed that the second order condition is fulﬁlled.
A.2 Negotiated tariﬀs




∗(r,t)=ˆ U(r,t)+( t − Q(r,t) − k)Y (r,t)+I + Π(r
∗,t
∗)+( Q(r,t) − t)Y (r,t)
= ˆ U(r,t) − kY(r,t)+I + Π(r
∗,t
∗)
subject to r = R(τ,k) and t = R(τ,k)+τ.W eh a v et h a t
Y (R(τ,k),R(τ,k)+τ)=




























b3τ +3 b2τ − kb2 − 2b + kb− τb+4− 5τ +2 k
(−2+b)
2 (b +2 )
2
The negotiated tariﬀ is therefore given by
1
2
b3τ +3 b2τ − kb2 − 2b + kb− τb+4− 5τ +2 k
(−2+b)






and the solution is
τ
n =( 2− b)
2+( 3+4 b + b2)k
5+b − 3b2 − b3
The second order condition can again be readily veriﬁed. By symmetry, τ∗ = τ.
38A.3 Equilibrium values
Inserting τn into the expression above yields:
r
n =
−3+b − (2 + 4b + b2)k
5+b − 3b2 − b3
t
n =
1 − b +( 4+b − 3b2 − b3)k
5+b − 3b2 − b3
x
n =
4 − b2 − b +( 1+3 b + b2)k
5+b − 3b2 − b3
y
n =
2 − b − b2 − (b +2 ) k
5+b − 3b2 − b3
p
n =
1 − b2 − (1 + b)k
5+b − 3b2 − b3
q
n =
3 − 2b − b2 +( 2− 3b2 − b3)k
5+b − 3b2 − b3
As can be seen, the environmental tax r decreases in k, while the total tax on imports t
increases in k.
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